Political-Mafia Electoral Exchange and "Any Other Benefit": Cassation No. 14344/2025 Clarifies Article 416-ter of the Criminal Code

The judgment in comment, filed on April 11, 2025, quashes with referral the ordinance of the Tribunal of Review of Catania which had deemed the crime under Article 416-ter of the Criminal Code to be constituted against A. N. The Supreme Court offers an important systematic reading of the amendments introduced by Law No. 43 of May 21, 2019, focusing on the concept of "any other benefit" promised or provided in exchange for votes.

The Core of the Decision: What is Meant by "Benefit"

Before the 2019 amendment, the political-mafia corrupt barter revolved around money or other "benefits" generally understood; today, the provision explicitly states that the counter-performance can consist of "other benefits" besides money. The Court clarifies that:

• the "benefit" must be concretely identified, although not necessarily economically quantifiable;
• it can consist of intangible advantages (e.g., jobs, permits, influence over administrative proceedings);
• vague mere animus promittendi, lacking patrimonial content or actual impact on the public interest, is excluded.

Jurisprudential Conflict and Constitutional Principles

The Panel distances itself from the dissenting ruling No. 51659/2023, which considered the promise to "take an interest" in some hirings to be sufficient. With a reference to the principles of specificity and determinacy (Art. 25 of the Constitution) and to the ECHR jurisprudence (judgments in Salabiaku and Kokkinakis), the Court of Cassation highlights how concrete offensiveness remains the guiding principle of criminal law interpretation. Generic "taking an interest" does not exceed the required threshold of harmfulness.

For the purpose of constituting the crime of political-mafia electoral exchange, under the text subsequent to the amendments introduced by Law No. 43 of May 21, 2019, the material object of the provision offered in exchange for the promise of votes can consist of "any other benefit," a term that includes any advantageous effect, even if not economically quantifiable. (Case in which the Court did not deem the crime to be constituted by the promise of a mayoral candidate "to take an interest" in the hiring of workers).

Comment: the maxim, by distinguishing between a mere promise of political commitment and a concrete benefit, reaffirms the need for a precise reciprocal link between electoral support and the advantage offered. Consequently, defense lawyers will have to verify the specificity of the promised benefit in the indictment, while administrators will have to adopt transparent conduct to avoid presumptions of exchange.

Practical Implications for Operators and Public Administration

In light of this orientation, some rules of conduct emerge:

• Candidates and electoral staff: avoid promises of administrative intercession, employment favors, or awarding contracts;
• Legal consultants: verify the traceability of any payments to individuals potentially linked to organized crime;
• Public administrations: develop transparency and staff rotation protocols in sensitive offices.

Furthermore, the need for coordination with anti-mafia prevention measures (Legislative Decree 159/2011) and with the regulations on party financing (Law Decree 149/2013) is emphasized.

Conclusions

Cassation No. 14344/2025 marks an important step towards a balanced interpretation of Article 416-ter of the Criminal Code: on the one hand, it broadens the scope of exchange to include non-pecuniary benefits; on the other hand, it requires such advantages to be concrete and determined, avoiding drifts towards criminal law of intention. A precedent that will guide future litigation on the boundary between legitimate political activity and mafia-like conduct aimed at influencing votes.