Judgment No. 10920 of 2024: Just Reparation and Presumption of Prejudice in Default Proceedings

The recent order No. 10920 of April 23, 2024, has generated considerable interest in the field of procedural law and just reparation for the unreasonable duration of proceedings. This ruling by the Court of Cassation specifically addresses the issue of parties' default and the presumption of non-existence of prejudice, clarifying fundamental aspects of current legislation.

Default and Presumption of Non-Existence of Prejudice

According to Law No. 89 of 2001, which governs just reparation for the unreasonable duration of proceedings, in cases of a party's default, there is a *iuris tantum* presumption of non-existence of prejudice. This means that, in the absence of active intervention by the involved party, it is presumed that no harm has resulted from the length of the proceedings.

Just Reparation - Art. 2, paragraph 2-sexies, letter b), of Law No. 89 of 2001 - Default - *Iuris tantum* presumption of non-existence of prejudice - Contrary evidence of the existence of distress - Admissibility. In cases of a party's default, the *iuris tantum* presumption of non-existence of prejudice due to the unreasonable duration of proceedings, provided for by Art. 2, paragraph 2-sexies, letter b), of Law No. 89 of 2001, can be overcome by contrary evidence regarding the existence of prejudice caused by distress arising from awareness of the proceedings, to which the interest in their swift conclusion is linked.

Contrary Evidence and Distress

The Court has clarified that, despite the presumption of non-existence of prejudice, it can be overcome by presenting contrary evidence. Specifically, the appellant can demonstrate the existence of concrete prejudice, arising from the distress caused by awareness of the proceedings' duration. This aspect is crucial, as it allows for the protection of the rights of a party who, despite not having actively participated in the proceedings, has nevertheless suffered psychological and moral damage.

In this regard, the possibility of proving prejudice, even in cases of default, represents a safeguard for the right to defense and justice, fundamental elements enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.

Conclusions

Judgment No. 10920 of 2024 introduces an important reflection on the protection of parties' rights in cases of default. It not only reaffirms the presumption of non-existence of prejudice but also paves the way for greater attention to contrary evidence. This balance between procedural requirements and the protection of individual rights is fundamental to ensuring a fair and just process, in line with the principles of European and national jurisprudence.