A pre-trial detention order represents one of the most critical moments in criminal proceedings because it immediately affects the personal liberty of the suspect. The Italian Supreme Court's ruling No. 14834 of 2025 specifically addresses the issue of review under Article 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (c.p.p.), clarifying whether the defence counsel – even with a special power of attorney – can request an adjournment of the hearing for defence needs. The Supreme Court, declaring the unconstitutionality claim unfounded, confirms a strict approach: only the suspect can request a postponement. Let's see why.
Article 309 governs the review by the review court of coercive measures. Paragraph 9-bis – introduced by Decree-Law 92/2014 – allows for the adjournment of the hearing "in the presence of justified reasons," but grants this faculty exclusively to the person subjected to the measure. The legal profession has, over time, raised doubts about constitutionality due to possible violation of Article 24 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to defence in every stage and degree of the proceedings.
In matters of precautionary appeals, the question of the constitutionality of Article 309, paragraph 9-bis, of the Code of Criminal Procedure is manifestly unfounded for conflict with Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, in that it does not provide that the defence counsel of the suspect or the defendant, equipped with a special power of attorney, may request an adjournment of the hearing to document the current state of drug addiction of their client, in order to verify the possibility of their submission to curative treatment at a National Health Service facility, given that the review procedure for orders imposing coercive measures is characterized by urgency, as the decision affects personal liberty. Therefore, the faculty to request an adjournment of the hearing, in the presence of justified reasons, is recognised solely to the suspect or defendant, the only party who could be harmed by the prolongation of the incidental proceeding. Comment: The Court reiterates that the urgency of the review, aimed at avoiding prolonged restriction of liberty, justifies the subjective limitation. According to the judges, only the suspect risks suffering concrete prejudice from the postponement; therefore, the lawyer cannot independently postpone the hearing, not even with a special power of attorney. This safeguards a balance between the speed of judicial review and the right to defence, which remains guaranteed by the possibility for the client to personally express the request.
The decision refers to consistent precedents (Cass. 13569/2012; 7403/2020; 14675/2018), creating a jurisprudential thread: the suspect is the exclusive holder of the faculty to request a postponement. It follows that any impediment of the defence counsel, except in cases of force majeure involving the client as well, is not sufficient to suspend the hearing.
The ruling has significant operational implications:
Cassation ruling No. 14834/2025 confirms that the review phase must proceed swiftly, with no possibility for the defence counsel to unilaterally slow it down. The interpretation is based on the idea that personal liberty requires rapid review rather than a postponement aimed at supplementing evidence. The challenge for criminal defence lawyers will therefore be to combine timeliness with the completeness of defence elements, always keeping the mandate and the actual will of the client at the centre.