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Рішення № 16414/2025 Касаційного суду: у апеляції достатньо правдоподібної реконструкції для виправдання | Адвокатське бюро Б'януччі

Cassation Ruling No. 16414/2025: A Plausible Reconstruction is Sufficient for Acquittal on Appeal

With decision No. 16414, filed on April 30, 2025, the Fifth Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation has once again outlined the contours of the "reasonable doubt" principle in appellate judgments. The case, originating from the Public Prosecutor's appeal against the acquittal of V. N. pronounced by the Court of Appeal of Palermo, provides an opportunity to reflect on the different evidentiary standards required in appeal compared to the first instance and on the operational implications for defence lawyers and judges.

Reference Legislative Framework

Articles 530 and 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, interpreted in light of constitutional and statutory case law, require the judge to pronounce an acquittal when the proof of guilt is lacking, insufficient, or contradictory. In the second instance, however, the evidentiary review does not involve a "new complete investigation": what matters is assessing whether the reconstruction offered by the defence is capable of shaking the certainty reached in the first instance.

Principle Affirmed in the Ruling

In appellate proceedings, reforming a conviction in favour of acquittal does not require the defence's presentation to overcome every reasonable doubt; it is sufficient for it to represent, based on the collected evidence, a different and plausible reconstruction of the facts compared to the one adopted by the first-instance judge, which renders guilt uncertain and suggests an acquittal outcome.

The Supreme Court, referring to precedents from the United Sections No. 33748/2005 and No. 27620/2016, clarifies that acquittal on appeal does not demand "positive proof" of innocence; it is sufficient – and necessary – that the new reading of the facts be reasonable, consistent with the case files, and capable of undermining the gravity, precision, and consistency of the circumstantial evidence relied upon in the first instance. This shifts the burden of argumentation from overcoming doubt to the emergence of a reasonable doubt that renders the prosecution's case unreliable.

Practical Implications for Lawyers and Judges

  • Defence Strategy: On appeal, it becomes crucial to highlight logical inconsistencies, motivational flaws, or plausible factual alternatives, even without producing new evidence.
  • Reasoning of the Appellate Judge: The reform judgment must explain why the new reconstruction is plausible and how it affects the judgment of guilt, avoiding formulaic statements.
  • Role of the Appealing Public Prosecutor: The public prosecutor appealing to the Court of Cassation must demonstrate the manifest illogicality of the acquittal reasoning, not merely rehash the prosecution's narrative from the first instance.
  • Constitutional Protection: The principle of liberty, enshrined in Article 27 of the Constitution, finds concrete application in the obligation to acquit in the presence of uncertainty, enhancing the protective function of the appeal.

Furthermore, the ruling's adherence to the parameters of the European Court of Human Rights is significant, according to which the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution, and any substantial doubt must be resolved in favour of the defendant (Article 6 ECHR).

Conclusions

The Court of Cassation, with the decision commented upon here, confirms a now consolidated trend: appellate proceedings are not a mere confirmation of the first instance but an independent forum for verifying the logical coherence of the conviction. To achieve acquittal, a plausible alternative reconstruction capable of rendering responsibility uncertain is sufficient. This is a clear message for defence lawyers seeking to overturn an unfavourable verdict and, at the same time, a warning to judges to provide precise reasoning for their decisions, respecting the principle of reasonable doubt.

Адвокатське бюро Б'януччі