With decision no. 16414, filed on April 30, 2025, the Fifth Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation has once again outlined the contours of the "reasonable doubt" principle in second-instance judgments. The case, originating from the Public Prosecutor's appeal against the acquittal of V. N. pronounced by the Court of Appeal of Palermo, provides an opportunity to reflect on the different evidentiary standard required on appeal compared to the first instance and its operational implications for defense lawyers and judges.
Articles 530 and 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, interpreted in light of constitutional and statutory case law, require the judge to pronounce an acquittal when the proof of guilt is lacking, insufficient, or contradictory. In the second instance, however, the evidentiary review does not coincide with a "new complete investigation"; what matters is assessing whether the reconstruction offered by the defense is capable of shaking the certainty reached in the first instance.
In appellate proceedings, reforming a conviction in favor of acquittal does not require the defense's presentation to overcome every reasonable doubt; it is sufficient that it represents, based on the collected evidence, a different and plausible reconstruction of the facts compared to the one adopted by the first-instance judge, rendering guilt uncertain and supporting an acquittal outcome.
The Supreme Court, referring to precedents from the United Sections no. 33748/2005 and no. 27620/2016, clarifies that acquittal on appeal does not demand "positive proof" of innocence; it is sufficient – and necessary – that the new reading of the facts be reasonable, consistent with the case file, and capable of undermining the gravity, precision, and coherence of the evidence relied upon in the first instance. This shifts the burden of argumentation from overcoming doubt to the emergence of a reasonable doubt that renders the prosecution's case unreliable.
Furthermore, the ruling's adherence to the parameters of the European Court of Human Rights is significant, according to which the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution, and any substantial doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant (Article 6 ECHR).
The Court of Cassation, with the decision commented herein, confirms a now consolidated trend: appellate proceedings are not a mere confirmation of the first instance but an autonomous forum for verifying the logical coherence of the conviction. To achieve acquittal, a plausible alternative reconstruction, capable of rendering responsibility uncertain, is sufficient. This is a clear message for defense lawyers seeking to overturn an unfavorable verdict and, at the same time, a warning to judges to provide precise reasoning for their decisions, respecting the principle of reasonable doubt.