Ruling No. 13615, filed on April 8, 2025, by the Sixth Criminal Section of the Court of Cassation marks a further definitive point on the issue of forgery in documents, addressing the – far from theoretical – legal nature of agreements entered into by public entities and the related criminal liabilities. The case, which saw public official F. D. V. as the defendant, provides an opportunity to reflect on a frequently debated boundary: when can a document be considered a "public act" under Article 479 of the Criminal Code?
The Court of Appeal of L'Aquila had convicted the official for ideological forgery, considering that the agreement he had prepared, which differed from the will of the competent body, was to be assimilated to a public act. The Court of Cassation, accepting the appeal, instead annulled the second-instance ruling without referral, recognizing the non-existence of the crime.
The conduct of a public official who deliberately drafts the content of an agreement in a manner divergent from the will of the body institutionally responsible for defining its contents does not constitute the crime of ideological forgery, provided for by Article 479 of the Criminal Code, given that the agreement does not have the nature of a public act, i.e., a document intended to attest even just the factual premises of an act, but rather an agreement between public parties, or between a public and a private party, for the regulation of matters of common interest.
Commentary: The Court refers to the typical function of a public act – to attest facts and declarations with privileged faith – distinguishing it from a contractual agreement, such as an agreement. It follows that, in the absence of this certifying function, the criminal protection provided by Article 479 of the Criminal Code cannot apply. This principle aligns with precedents from 1992 and more recent rulings (Cass. 17089/2022; 37880/2021), strengthening an already consolidated trend.
The decision is based on the combined provisions of Articles 476-479 of the Criminal Code and Article 2699 of the Civil Code, which defines a public act. The agreement, even if drawn up by a public official, remains an administrative or mixed contract: it lacks the purpose of documenting procedural truth, being limited to regulating interests between the parties. The erroneous transcription of the contractual will may, at most, be relevant on a civil level (voidability, pre-contractual liability, or damages) or administrative level (disciplinary or financial liability), but it falls outside the criminal sphere of forgery.
The verdict offers operational guidance to those who draft or supervise agreements:
The Court of Cassation reiterates that the scope of ideological forgery must be strictly delimited, in accordance with the principle of specificity and strict interpretation of criminal law. When faced with a document that, although drawn up by a public official, performs essentially contractual functions, criminal protection against forgery cannot be invoked. For administrations, professionals, and citizens, the ruling offers a valuable guide: before invoking the Criminal Code, it is necessary to ascertain the true nature of the act. Only in this way can undue indictments be avoided and potential claims for damages be directed towards the correct legal channels.